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CAN OPINION BE STABLE IN AN OPEN NETWORK WITH HIERARCHY? 
AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT OF PARIS 
 
The co-evolution of social networks and opinion formation has received increasing attention 
in recent years. As a contribution to the growing literature on this topic, we explore 
connections between empirical data representing the advice network of judges at the 
Commercial Court in Paris and an agent-based simulation protocol testing various hypotheses 
on the motives that drive agent behaviors. A previous work (Rouchier et al. 2007) had already 
modeled the dynamics of advice-seeking among judges and studied the implications of 
different rationality assumptions on the shape of the emerging network. Here, we add an 
influence model to the previously examined advice-seeking relationships in order to explore 
the possibility that there is a form of “culture” at the Court that harmonizes the opinions of 
members over time; we identify a set of relevant stylized facts, and we use new indicators to 
evaluate how agents choose with whom to interact within this framework. The basic 
assumptions we analyze are that they seek advice from senior judges who are higher up in the 
hierarchy, who enjoy high reputation, or who are similar to them. Our simulations test which 
criterion –or which combination of criteria– is most credible, by comparing both the 
properties of the emerging network and the dynamics of opinion at the Court to the stylized 
facts. Our results single out the combination of criteria that most likely guide individuals’ 
selection of advisors and provide insight into their effects on opinion formation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly presents our case study, the Commercial 
Court of Paris, and derives relevant stylized facts. Section 2 illustrates the main features and 
overall structure of the model, while section 3 outlines our main results on indegree centrality 
and section 4 focuses on our findings on opinion. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. The case study: the Commercial Court of Paris (CCP). 
1.1 The CCP as a judicial institution 
The Commercial Court of Paris (CCP) is a five-century old judicial institution which handles 
about 12% of commercial litigation and bankruptcy cases in France, including complex and 
politically sensitive ones. Interestingly, CCP members are not career magistrates but 
experienced businesspeople or top-level company managers who are elected by their peers 
and exercise their functions as unpaid volunteers. In this sense the CCP is an example of 
“joint regulation” of markets (Falconi et al. 2005; Lazega and Mounier 2003) integrating 
representatives of the private sector with the public sector. 
The structure of the institution needs to be briefly presented as our model reproduces its main 
features. First, the fact that mandates are for a fixed term of up to 14 years implies a regular 
turnover, with joiners and leavers every year. Second, the Court is composed of about 21 
specialized and generalist Chambers in charge of different forms of commercial litigation and 
bankruptcy, with an average of 7 judges in each of them; to reduce the risk of corruption and 
conflict of interest, a formal rotation rule reassigns judges to a new Chamber every year. 
Finally, the CCP is a hierarchical institution which ascribes significant power to the President 
of the Court and Presidents of Chambers. Hierarchy is closely related to seniority as 
Presidents must have been at the Court for at least 8 years; an appointment as President 
confers a status that is conserved even after this role is passed to someone else. 
Judges face multifaceted tasks requiring multiple competencies –legal, economic, managerial 
among others. Conflict resolution often calls for detailed knowledge of the norms, customs, 
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and expectations of the particular industry concerned. Unlike career magistrates, CCP 
members have hands-on experience in a variety of trade sectors. One argument to legitimize 
this lay institution is precisely that it pools and shares experience and expertise. Indeed, CCP 
judges intensely exchange advice and information with one another. 
Together with specialized information, advice ties channel normative orientations on how to 
deal with situations in which judges have discretion. Different views may coexist and be 
discussed on, say, the merits of the free market, the respective roles of the public and private 
sectors, and the perimeter of regulation.  
 
1.2 Stylized facts: network formation and opinion dynamics 
To identify stylized facts, we rely on data on advice-seeking among CCP members which 
were collected by Emmanuel Lazega and Lise Mounier in 2000, 2002, and 2005. Judges were 
asked about their advice ties to one another, and a high response rate enabled to reconstitute 
the complete advice network among them at each wave.  
First, the data reveals that the degree distribution is asymmetric, particularly regarding 
indegrees1, as can be seen in Figure 1. There is a correlation between degree and seniority: 
junior judges, including newcomers, have low indegrees (i.e. are little sought out), while 
seniors and Presidents have high indegrees (i.e. are much sought out). The reverse is true for 
outdegrees2, which are higher for junior than for senior judges, indicating that the former seek 
more advice than the latter.  
In 2005, judges were also interviewed about their normative views, particularly the extent to 
which they believed they should be punitive in their decisions on matters of unfair 
competition between entrepreneurs. For the purposes of this paper, we interpret punitivity as 
severity in their interpretation of the law in cases in which they have discretion3.  
Our second empirical fact is that opinion appears to be correlated with seniority in that junior 
judges are on the whole more severe than senior judges; it is also related to degree, as severe 
judges have relatively low indegrees and high outdegrees. In fact the most central advisors are 
senior judges, often with a formal role as President of Chamber, and typically non-punitive. 
These observations suggest that some process may lead judges to become less severe over 
time, and that it may depend on judges’ advice-seeking activity, at least to some extent.  
 
                                                 
1 Indegrees measure the number of incoming ties, and indegree centrality captures the extent to which an actor is 
identified by others as one of their contacts (Kilduff and Krackhardt 1994); it can be interpreted as a form of 
popularity or prestige (Wassermann and Faust 1994, pp. 174-75, 202-203). 
2 Outdegrees measure the number of outgoing ties. 
3 More precisely, being punitive means awarding the injured party not only “material” damages but also “moral” 
damages: the former are amounts of money that make up for the losses incurred because of the unfair behavior of 
the offender, while the latter are solely meant to discourage relapse into such practices. There is no consensus on 
whether the very concept of moral damages applies to business. 
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Figure 1: Observed indegree centrality at waves 1, 2, 3. Indegrees are on the y-axis and judges’ position in 
the ranking of indegrees (in ascending order) on the x-axis; it emerges that the majority of judges receive 
very few requests for advice, if any, while a core of highly central advisors are much sought out by others. 
It can be noted that the three waves are slightly different in values but share the same qualitative shape. 
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The model we are now going to outline aims at reproducing these stylized facts so as to 
provide insight into the processes that lead to them. 
 
2. The model 
Our model represents an evolving social network with an exogenously given hierarchy which 
defines progress up the ladder, a regular flow of newcomers and leavers, and an internal 
rotation rule. The model addresses the question of who interacts with whom, and is evaluated 
with two indicators: evolution of opinion over time and a measure of convergence of opinion 
towards shared values. It simulates the advice-seeking interactions of a population of artificial 
Agents4, and the ensuing changes in individual opinion. Agents are defined by attributes that 
represent their position in the hierarchy (current Chamber, role as current or former President, 
seniority), others that define their opinion, and their indegree centrality which is computed at 
each step.   
We draw on a widely applied (abstract) influence model (Deffuant et al. 2002). While the 
original version assumes random pair matching during which Agents may influence each 
other, the choice of communication partners may not be random in our case but rather follow 
a systematic pattern. Thus, in what follows we first outline our hypotheses for the choice of 
communication partners and their empirical and theoretical bases, then we describe the model 
itself: the influence mechanism and our implementation of the choice of partners. We 
conclude with an overview of the simulation dynamics and its main parameters. 
 
2.1 Hypotheses about the choice mechanism 
Our assumption is that Agents have three basic ways to choose whom to communicate with: 
• Authority: seek advice from judges higher up in the hierarchy (Presidents).  
• Reputation: seek advice from those who are most sought out by others. 
                                                 
4 We follow the agent-based literature in noting Agent when referring to artificial entities, and agent in the case 
of real-world ones. 
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• Homophily: seek advice from similar judges (i.e. who share the same opinions).   
These representations of choice mechanisms are grounded in the sociological and 
organizational literature. Support for the authority argument stems primarily from Blau’s 
(1955, 1964) social exchange theory, according to which status recognition tends to be given 
in exchange for advice in organizations. Thus, members high up in the formal hierarchy are 
most likely to be consulted. Blau’s prediction is confirmed by the empirical observation that 
advice networks often exhibit a pecking order that closely follows hierarchy; evidence of such 
a mechanism was found for the Court advice network database by Lazega et al. (2006).  
The case for reputation draws from the fact that with imperfect information, reputation can be 
taken as an indicator of the competency of an advisor and approximated by indegree centrality 
in the advice network. Indeed the latter measures the extent to which an individual is 
consulted, presumably for work-related input (Klein et al. 2004); thus, it helps to infer his/her 
degree of expertise. Indegree-dependent effects are often self-reinforcing, with the most 
popular advice-givers being increasingly sought out over time (Lazega et al. 2006). 
The tendency towards homophilous choices, i.e. to form ties to similar others, is well 
documented (McPherson et al. 2001). Various dimensions of homophily have been 
investigated in the literature, for instance based on gender, education, or nationality; similarity 
of opinions may also generate homophilous choices of advisors (this is the dimension we 
focus on). Homophily may attenuate or reinforce the effects of hierarchy and reputation, 
sometimes in complex ways as shown by Lazega et al. (2008). 
 
2.2 Agents: attributes and processes  
Influence 
Our representation of opinion change follows the “relative agreement” model of Deffuant et al. 
(2002), to which the reader should refer since we have little space to describe it thoroughly. 
Agent j is characterized by two continuous variables on [0, 1], namely its opinion xj and its 
uncertainty uj; its “opinion segment” is defined as the segment of length 2.uj around xj. 
Continuous values allow opinion to vary smoothly between the two extremes of the 
acceptable range; uncertainty is a measure of lack of individual self-confidence. At 
initialization, Presidents and senior Agents have “low” opinion (0.1 to 0.3, i.e. not too severe, 
consistently with empirical data) and low uncertainty (0.1, to suggest that experience and 
position in the hierarchy may increase self-confidence). For other Agents and newcomers, 
uncertainty is higher (0.7) and opinion is uniformly picked between 0 (non severe) and 1 
(severe). These values are tested in the simulations presented below. 
When an Agent meets another, it can be influenced only if the opinion of the other is included 
in its opinion segment. If there is influence, it is both in opinion and uncertainty, and it is 
proportional to the overlap between the two Agents’ opinion segments (the agreement), 
divided by the uncertainty of the influencing Agent (expressing relativity in the sense that a 
more confident advisor has stronger influence). Notice that relativity makes the mechanism 
non-symmetric: only in some cases do the opinion and uncertainty of both Agents vary.  
Choice mechanism 
Agents’ attributes determine their actions according to the following three-step process. 
First, an Agent chooses whether to seek advice or not. To do so, it picks a number randomly 
from a uniform distribution and compares it to its uncertainty (between 0 and 1): if it is lower, 
this Agent will seek advice. The higher the uncertainty, the more advice is sought; hence with 
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the aforementioned differentiation between juniors and seniors, the former are more likely to 
seek advice than the latter, consistently with the empirical fact that those with lower seniority 
at the CCP have higher outdegrees.  
Second, if an Agent seeks advice, it must select an advisor, with criteria that depend on the 
type of simulation we run: a “pure” or “mixed” choice, both based on the hypotheses exposed 
earlier, or random choice. More precisely, we consider six options: 
• Authority: 60%5 chance of selecting the President of its own Chamber; then 
24% probability of selecting another President and a 16% probability of simply 
drawing a non-president more senior Agent6. 
• Reputation: 60% probability of picking up from the subset of the 10 advisors 
who have the highest indegree centrality levels, and a 40% probability of 
picking up a more senior advisor.  
• Homophily: more senior advisors whose opinion is close enough for influence 
to take place (according to the Deffuant model).  
• Mixed strategies are Authority-Reputation and Authority-Homophily with 50% 
probability of choosing one of these two choice procedures.  
• Random: Any Agent with higher seniority.  
Third, once an Agent has sought advice according to one of these criteria, it may be 
influenced by its advisor; in this case, it updates its opinion and uncertainty as explained 
above. 
 
2.3 Simulation dynamics 
A simulation is organized around two different time units. A step represents a year in the real 
Court, and a sub-step represents a month, with 10 months per year. 147 Agents belong to 21 
Chambers of 7. Each year, all Agents who have been there for 14 years leave the Court and an 
equal number of newcomers replace them, while all remaining Agents are re-allocated 
randomly to a new Chamber. Agents that have been at the Court for more than 8 years can be 
President of a Chamber, with only one President per Court at each step. Newcomers are given 
uncertainty and opinion as described earlier, and an “age” (seniority) of 0 at entry.  
At initialization, Agents’ age is randomly picked between 0 and 14; those with age of at least 
8 are given low uncertainty and low opinion, whereas those with age of 7 or less are given 
high uncertainty. 
Each month, Agents decide whether to seek advice; if they do, they also choose an advisor. 
Then, centrality and opinion are observed for all. We run the simulation for multiples of 14 
steps, so that we have several “generations” in a row (agents that are there at start will all be 
gone after 14 years).  
Parameters for a simulation are: the type of choice for interaction (1), the initial opinion (2) 
and uncertainty (3) of initial senior agents (more than 8 years), the opinion (4) and uncertainty 
(5) of initial junior agents and of subsequent newcomers. In this paper we develop precise 
results that correspond to 18 simulation protocols with all six values for parameter 1 and three 
values for parameter 2. 
                                                 
5 A probability of 60% was suggested by Lazega and Mounier based on fieldwork. In Rouchier et al. (2007) it 
was shown to lead to plausible indegree centrality values. 
6 All random choices in the model are drawn from uniform distributions.  
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3. First set of results: Centrality 
To evaluate our hypotheses on how judges select their advisors, let us first compare simulated 
and empirical indegrees (Figure 2). Our purpose is to identify which of the six options under 
scrutiny best approximates real-world data, in the hope to provide insight into the underlying 
social processes. 
 
Figure 2: Simulated vs. empirical indegree centrality. Simulated values are obtained with pure forms of 
choice, randomness, and mixed forms, at the end of a simulation period of 70 time-steps (i.e. five 
“generations”), corresponding to the medium-long run. Empirical indegrees are taken at the last date of 
observation (wave 3). Agents’ indegrees are on the ordinate and their position in the global ranking of 
indegrees is on the abscissa. 
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It appears that pure choices do not fit the data well. Both authority and homophily produce a 
relatively large group of middle-level advisors with indegrees between 10 and 20 and maxima 
of about 30, much lower than observed values. Reputation divides Agents into two groups, a 
large one with lower indegrees than in the data, and a tiny one with indegrees of more than 70, 
much higher than empirical levels. Random choice is also unsatisfactory: while it follows the 
empirical distribution rather closely for low-rank agents, it yields a relatively low maximum 
that hardly fits the data. Mixed strategies perform better, particularly Authority-Reputation 
which separates agents into three groups, one with bottom-level indegrees (0-10), one with 
intermediate-level values (10-20), and one with high values (about 35-50, very close to 
observed values). Instead, the Authority-Homophily mechanism produces a maximum lower 
than 20, inconsistent with the data. 
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The Authority-Reputation mechanism enables both exogenous factors (seniority and formal 
roles) and endogenous mechanisms to affect the evolution of the advice network. Rouchier et 
al. (2007) note that, if we start from pure reputation and add formal hierarchy, we observe an 
increase in the number of central actors and a reduction of the gap between those with the 
highest indegrees and the others. In sociological perspective, this result sheds light on the 
importance of a formalized hierarchy for the distribution of knowledge and power. 
Conversely, if we take pure hierarchy as our starting point, adding reputation allows some 
non-senior, non-president agents to acquire centrality, which reflects the fact that informal 
networks may deviate from official organizational charts, with a potential impact on 
performance (see e.g. Krackhardt and Hanson 1993). The difference between results obtained 
with the mixed strategy and its two pure components suggests that although formal positions 
at the CCP are sometimes correlated with high centrality, it is not always the case, and 
informal mechanisms also operate. 
The fact that the authority-reputation mechanism prevails over authority-homophily confirms 
the finding of Lazega et al. (2008) that at the CCP, status is decisive but there is no pure effect 
of norm similarity on advisor selection.   
 
4. Opinion dynamics 
To assess agents’ criteria for selection of advisors, we also need to account for the possibility 
of a kind of organizational “culture” that may transform the opinion of members over time. 
We use two main indicators to characterize the system: the evolution of average opinion and 
the opinion of agents at the last time step relative to their age. For the latter indicator, two 
typical situations can arise: 1/ either all Agents converge to the same opinion after they have 
been in the Court for some years or 2/ they display two diverging opinions and the distance 
between these opinions is larger than the uncertainty of newcomers. These two situations are 
similar to the possible equilibria described in Deffuant et al. (2002). As said before, for each 
choice procedure, we study three initial settings: when initial senior members are very tolerant 
(with a low opinion of 0.1) and increasingly less tolerant (opinions of 0.2 and 0.3). 
 
Figure 3 : represents the opinion of Agents present at the Court after 70 time-steps. Age is on the abscissa 
and opinion on the ordinate, and we observe the number of clusters of opinion for Senior Agents, those 
who have been in the Court long enough to learn. Two cases can be identified: two opinions (for 
Homophily and initial Senior opinion of 0.1); one opinion (for Authority and initial Senior opinion of 0.3).  
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What we observe in this setting is that results depend both on the choice procedure and on the 
initial opinion of Senior Agents. In table 1, this result is made more precise. The data are 
given for 10 simulations per case, as an average which is statistically significant.  
 
Table 1 : Opinion of Senior Agents at final time step, by initial Senior opinion and mode of advisor 
selection. The results are given for 10 simulations for each case –i.e. initial Senior opinion of 0.1, 0.2, and 
0.3. With Homophily, two groups always emerge and the larger one in all cases is the one with high value 
opinion (as in figure 3 above). With Authority or Random, which give high importance to the structure of 
interaction, when the initial value is low a small group of high-opinion Seniors emerges as well.  
 
Average 
opinion 
0.1 0.2 0.3 Percentage of Senior Agents 
with high opinion  
0.1 0.2 0.3 
Authority 
 
0.3 0.3 0.34 Authority 
 
18 8 0 
Reputation 0.44 0.44 0.47 Reputation 0 0 0 
Homophily 0.78 0.76 0.76 Homophily 95 90 92 
Random 0.28 0.29 0.35 Random 15 0 0 
Authority-
Reputation 
0.38 0.39 0.41 Authority-Reputation 0 0 0 
Authority-
Homophily 
0.28 0.30 0.33 Authority-Homophily 15 8 0 
 
Two situations can be observed in the system, either there is just one opinion among Senior 
Agents at the end of the simulations or two opinions cohabit. Remarkably in most cases, the 
average opinion of seniors remains very close to the initial Senior opinion. In most cases as 
well, the number of Agents that deviate is very low. This means that even after 5 generations, 
Agents who stay for more than 8 years in the Court are led to think similarly to those who left 
the organization 70 years before. The initial opinion has an impact, as well as the way of 
choosing who to communicate with. The lower the initial opinion of Seniors, the more often 
one can witness the formation of two groups, because a higher number of newcomers cannot 
communicate with those who are attracted by, or are at, the lower opinion of the beginning. 
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Two separated groups appear most often when Homophily is used for choosing other Agents, 
which means that there is a reinforcement among Agents who deviate from the low opinion. 
In all other cases, one can consider that extremely few Agents deviate, and that they have 
almost no impact on the average final opinion. Hence, almost all of our current choice 
procedures are in line with the data collected in the study. In particular, this is true of the 
Authority-Reputation procedure (which has been shown above to be particularly relevant for 
indegree centrality). It has to be noted that the reproduction of culture in a group of this kind 
has not been produced with such a simple algorithm until now. 
 
5. Conclusions 
For the moment, the mix of Authority and Reputation gives the best result in the simulation 
compared to field data. It corresponds to important observed features of our case study and 
gives rise to plausible results on opinion, showing the combined importance of both the 
formal structure of the Court and of endogenous reinforcement effects. 
For future work, homophily has to be defined differently for two reasons. First, it gives 
outlying results in terms of evolution of opinion. Second, the algorithm itself may be little 
credible, since the information needed for Agents to choose whom to ask advice, requires 
information that is unlikely to be available before communication takes place (opinion). As a 
consequence, we plan to redefine homophily and make it more dependent on structure (age 
classes for example).  
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